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Abstract 
The aim of this study is to evaluate the political parties in Turkey in terms of their 
coherence to intra-party democracy. This evaluation is carried out on the Constitution, 
Political Parties Law and Party Bylaws. In this perspective, the bylaws of Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) in power for almost ten years in center-right and Republican 
People’s Party (CHP) in the center-left as the main opposition party for the last two terms are 
compared according to the related articles of the Political Parties Law. The study is composed 
of nine intercorrelated subheadings. As a result of the study, it is concluded that the political 
parties law does not include imperatives to encourage intra-party democracy. Therefore, the 
law itself is a major obstacle before democracy. Political parties law does not involve any 
precautions to encourage intra-party democracy in such issues as delegate election, 
determination of MP candidates or chairman election, etc. Political party bylaws, on the other 
hand, do not provide any imperatives to actualise intra-party democracy. It is, therefore, 
concluded that the most crucial reason for the political parties in Turkey not to have intra-
party democracy is the related legal arrangements.  
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Introduction 
There are numerous definitions of democracy, but all these different views can settle 
on its content: “Government of the people, by the people, for the people.” This well-known 
definition by Abraham Lincoln is based on the fact that he attributed governance to the 
people (Heywood, 1992: 272). Direct democracy, a legacy of ancient Greek city-states, has 
been replaced with representative democracy and thus, political parties have found their 
places in democratic systems as the intermediaries to conduct the representation mechanism. 
The position of political parties in representative democracy makes them 
indispensable for the continuation and functioning of democracy. There are certain reasons 
that make political parties indispensable in a democracy. Democratic regimes are the only 
ones in which power changes hands legitimately. In other words, democracy is a regime in 
which those who will compose the government are chosen by the public for a certain period 
through free elections (Sarıbay, 2001: 16). Participation of the public in the administration 
and the need for an organization to determine the public preferences are the most significant 
reasons that make parties indispensable in a democracy. Another important role of parties is 
that, except for elections, they form a crucial bridge between the ruler and the ruled. Another 
reason to mention is that, in the course of a healthy democracy, they form a link in informing 
the public about the issues that interest them and in relaying the public opinion about the 
choice of various public administration policies to the government (Sarıbay, 2001: 16; 
Kabasakal, 2012: 2). 
While the above-mentioned reasons make political parties indispensable elements of 
democracy, they, on the other hand, necessitate their internal structure to be democratic as 
well. In the context of Turkey, various studies (Esmer, 2002; Heper and Landau, 1991; 
Özbudun, 2000) determined that political parties have oligarchic tendencies.  The Jacobean 
modernization history of Turkey and the fact that the public hasn’t been able to internalize a 
democratic culture adequately yet can help us understand why the political parties in Turkey 
have oligarchic tendencies. However, this, in fact, is an effort to understand how culture 
affects political institutions. Already accepting the effect of culture on political institutions, 
this study aims to analyze how the legal statute that interests parties as political institutions 
turns them into anti-democratic structures. 
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 In this perspective, this study focuses on legal status that affects the internal 
organization of political parties in Turkey that exhibit oligarchic tendencies by analyzing the 
Turkish Republic Constitution, Political Parties Law (SPK) and two political party bylaws: 
one is Justice and Development Party (AKP) in power for almost ten years in center-right and 
the other is Republican People’s Party (CHP) in the center-left as the main opposition party 
for the last two terms. It is projected that choosing parties being not only the ruling and the 
main opposition but at the same time left and right wing will help us determine why the 
political parties in Turkey are devoid of intra-party democracy. 
While reviewing the related legislation, such issues as choosing the leader and his/her 
power, how the party executives are determined, how candidates for party deputy and local 
executives in intra-party democracies are determined, and how party policies are formed were 
analyzed in terms of legal by-law aspects. In the study, the fact that there is no intra-party 
democracy in Turkey was primarily based on the Political Parties Law (SPK) and therefore 
on party bylaws.  
Emphasis of Democracy in Constitution, Political Parties Law and Party Bylaws  
The 68th article of the Turkish Republic Constitution says “Political parties are the 
indispensable elements of democratic political life.” The same clause is repeated again in the 
4th article of SPK and the 92nd article states that such issues as party administration and 
election of the party organs cannot be undue to democratic principles.  This clause is also 
restated in many different places in the bylaws of Justice and Development Party (AKP). For 
example, it is said in the 13th sub-clause of 4th article of the by-law “Justice and Development 
Party minds the pluralist, participative and competitive nature of representative democracy.” 
Again, supporting such an attitude, the 5th article, stating that assignments and elections 
within the party will be conducted seeking intra-party democracy and therefore merit and 
competence will be the first and foremost criteria, considers intra-party democracy within the 
basic principles to be sought. The 14th article, saying “Each and every rank of assignment and 
representation post in the party is open to every member of the party to be a candidate and to 
serve for within the by-law rules”, seems to denote a democratic mechanism. The bylaws of 
the Republican People’s Party (CHP) describes democracy is based upon. It is stated that 
social democracy “is based on such values as human rights, supremacy of law, freedom, 
equality, solidarity, a peaceful and fair world, supremacy of labor, sustainable and balanced 
progress, welfare, conservation of nature and environment, pluralistic and participatory 
democracy” (article 3).  One of the objectives of the party is creating a structure upon 
“pluralistic and participatory democracy”. It is also mentioned that the members and 
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executive staff are constantly trained in order to achieve a democratic culture. As is seen, the 
principles of CHP refer to a democratically perception like those of AKP; however, when the 
bylaws are examined thoroughly, it is seen that this case remains unfulfilled and is not 
applied wholly.  
This fact can clearly be seen in the regulation for “intra-party democracy arbitral 
committee” in the 99, 100, 101 and 102th articles of AKP by-law. The name of the above-
mentioned committee might sound as if it could play a role in sorting out probable injustices 
in intra-party competitions that could actualise intra-party democracy; however, the task of 
the related committee is described in the 101th article as follows:  “The committee provides 
the compromise environment and agreement way for any disagreement between city party 
organs and sub-level organs or organ members, between subsidiary organs or organ members 
or between them and party organs or organ members due to party tasks.” As seen in the 
definition, this committee wasn’t considered to build up or help function a democratic 
structure, but rather, to be a committee to sort out intra-party conflicts. 
Big Congress and Intra-party Democracy 
 How the chairman is elected, how central executive and administrative committees 
are determined and how candidates are determined for general and local elections show 
whether intra-party democracy can prevail. These can be analyzed through bylaws. While 
analyzing these subjects, first SPK and then the by-laws of two political parties will be 
analyzed. It will be better to start with how the decision makers of the “big congress” are 
chosen because this big congress, according to SKP, is considered to be the highest organ of a 
political party (article 14).  Again according to SPK, during this big congress, many vital 
decisions like the party chairman, central organ members, the party policy, financial matters 
and even the termination of the party are made.  
The law stipulates that the big congress is composed of two different members: ordinary 
and elected members. Ordinary members are determined as “party chairman, central 
decision-making and administrative committee and central disciplinary board members and 
ministers and members of parliament that are party members”. The 14th article includes the 
party founders into ordinary members. The founders are “among the ordinary members of the 
big congress, including the first big congress, as long as their numbers do not exceed 15% of 
the delegates”. The law leaves what to do to party in-laws. The formation of elected members 
is the core of achieving intra-party democracy. According to SPK, the elected members of the 
big congress are composed of “the delegates chosen in city congresses as shown in the party 
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by-law the number of whom cannot be higher than the whole number of Turkish Grand 
National Assembly (TBMM) members”. The max number of elected members can be 1100. 
The AKP by-law, after a complex narration, states that determination of those who will be 
elected and form the majority of the delegates is done as follows: election of the big congress 
delegates is conducted through list system in which the delegates to represent the city are 
determined in city congresses through a list determined by city administration and approved 
by city delegates. This is not consistent with intra-party democracy and gets worse thinking 
that the town delegates who elect the big congress delegates are also determined through list 
system. This becomes clear when the 46/7 article of AKP by-law is analyzed. This article 
clearly states “organ and delegate elections are done through list system”. It stipulates the list 
to be put into the ballot box in an envelope. This is such a model that is susceptible to 
manipulation of the party center and by no means supports a competitive democracy at local 
level. It is literally a fake election in which AKP delegates elect party executives.  
In the bylaws of CHP, ordinary members are arranged according to SPK rules. The 
elected members are stated to be “the congress delegates elected during city congresses as 
twice the number of that city’s TBMM member number”. After stating that both ordinary and 
elected members are congress members, in addition to these, “Congress Honor Members” are 
mentioned (article 53). Congress Honor Members can address in congresses but cannot vote 
(article 48).  
According to “Republican People’s Party Congresses (Election of The Delegates of City 
and Town Congresses, Neighborhood Unit and City Congresses) Regulation”, which states 
that delegate election in CHP is conducted upon by-law, the rule both in the city congress in 
the election of delegates to represent the city in the big congress and in the town congresses 
in the election of the delegates to attend the upper organ congress is the only and common list 
(sheet list) (article 27).  A block list system of election can only be decided “with a written 
proposal of one tenth of congress members and absolute majority of the members attending 
the congress (those who have attended voting in the congress hall) before proceeding with the 
agenda” during city and town congresses (By-law Article 48/J). Therefore, the primary act is 
the only and common list (sheet list) and the block list is secondary. The ballot is prepared as 
common a list in the sheet list system and voting is done by putting a tick in the names of the 
candidates on the voting paper. Those with the highest votes are the original members and the 
following ones become substitute members. On the other hand, the organs are put on the 
ballots separately. According to block list system, on the other hand, the candidate names on 
ballot papers are in the number of original and substitute members and they are printed as 
European Scientific Journal    April 2013 edition vol.9, No.11    ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
38 
 
block list. The former is more democratic than the latter; however, it is also possible to apply 
to be original and substitute member candidate. In block list, the names can be crossed over 
and changed. The votes every candidate has from the list s/he stands for and from other lists 
in which his/her name is added by a member or a delegate during voting are summed and so 
the list order is determined (By-law Article 48/J).  Accordingly, the above-mentioned 
practices increase the democratic aspect of this method. Compared with the AKP, 
manipulation of the center is less and the system encourages competition at the local level 
more.  
Election of the Chairman and Intra-party Democracy  
 Election of the delegates composing the top decision and supervision organ through a 
non-competitive method that does not encourage participation gives an undemocratic 
structure to all organs and committees. However, the analysis isn’t complete yet: the 
chairman elections should be analyzed too. 15th article of SPK doesn’t provide any 
arrangements for candidateship despite some regulations for election, authority, tasks, term of 
office and etc. of the chairman. The law stipulates that if the chairmanship falls vacant, the 
Central Decision-Making and Administrative Committee (MKYK) hands over the authority 
to represent the party to a member among themselves until the big congress and calls the big 
congress in forty five days latest. SPK determines the term of office of the chairman as three 
years at most, but doesn’t determine where, how and in what procedure the chairman will be 
elected. The law rules that the chairman is elected “… by the congress through secret vote 
and with absolute majority of member whole number” and “… if no result is obtained in the 
first two voting, the one who gets the highest votes” becomes the chairman. How deputy 
chairmen, general secretary, etc. are elected, their duties and authority are all left to party 
bylaws. 
 The 69th article of the AKP by-law regulates election. The article states that in order 
to be the chairman in the AKP, “written proposal of at least 20% of the member whole 
number” is required. This ratio seems rather high to run for the chairmanship, but CHP 
bylaws requires it to be “at least 30%” (Article 55/a). In this respect, comparing the two 
parties, AKP is in a more antidemocratic stance than the CHP. On the other hand, if we also 
remember that in AKP the congress delegates are determined in a list system, the ratio 20% 
seems adequate to declare chairmen “unchangeable”. As a matter of fact, in practice, the 
same leaders are in action as the actors on the political stage. 
 Another point to pay attention while reviewing the bylaws in terms of chairmanship 
election is the number of extraordinary sessions of big congresses. In the 14th article of SPK, 
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in order for the big congress to have an extraordinary session, authority lies in the chairman, 
MKYK or big congress members, the ratio of which is determined by law. If the first two 
requires an extraordinary session, they can assemble the congress. With regards to 
democracy, the main point is the authority of big congress members. SPK bases an 
extraordinary session on “the written proposal of at least one fifth of congress members”.  
 70th article of the AKP by-law and 49th article of the CHP by-law regulate 
extraordinary session matter.  The fact that SPK is protected likewise is clear in the bylaws of 
AKP and CHP. According to the related article; “An extraordinary session can be called upon 
written request of at least one fifth of the big congress delegates.” This can be considered as a 
qualifying term for chairmanship contest.  
 On the other hand, another point should be emphasized in chairmanship and AKP by-
law. When AKP was first established, it was stipulated that one who had three terms of office 
consecutively cannot run for chairmanship again, but this challenge was sorted out during the 
fourth ordinary congress in September 2012 through a little amendment, with which a 
chairman for three consecutive terms can run for chairmanship for the fourth time after 
recessing for one term. This clearly shows that a practice that could enable intra-party 
democracy was sacrificed for the sake of central authority.   
Formation of Party Senior Administration and Intra-party Democracy 
 Another way to look into whether intra-party democracy is functional is to look into 
how party senior administration; that is, Central Decision-Making and Administrative 
Committee (MKYK) for the AKP and Party Assembly for CHP, is formed. SPK determined 
in the 16th article how main party organs can be formed. The law leaves the names, 
configurations and numbers of organs to party bylaws. The members of central decision-
making and administrative committee, who have a wide scope of authority (decision-making 
and applying) except for critical decisions in the big congress, are elected by the big 
congress. In the article 16/5, election procedure and principles of other central organs are left 
to the party bylaws; that is, a democratic formation isn’t encouraged SPK. This, literally, 
causes the parties to transform the election rules in such that party leader staff assigns 
candidates and the big congress delegates approve them. 
 According to AKP by-law, one of the issues crippling intra-party democracy is the 
formation of Central Decision-Making and Administrative Committee (MKYK), the highest 
decision and executive organ. The MKYK members are chosen in the big congress through 
the list system according to the article 46/7. In other words, after AKP determines the 50 
original and 25 substitute members to compose MKYK, the related list is voted by the 
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delegates. It would be too naive to think that there can be names of opposition to top 
administration in the list or that there is no manipulation of the chairman in the formation of 
the list. 
 Similarly, one of the elements crippling intra-party democracy in CHP by-law is the 
formation of Party Assembly: the Party Assembly is composed of the chairman and 60 
members elected by the congress through secret vote (article 37). During the congress, the 
rule for organ election is the only and common list (sheet list). However, before proceeding 
to the agenda, block list election system could be decided with the proposal of one tenth of 
congress members and approval of absolute majority of the attendant members of the 
congress. On the other hand, eight of the original members of the Party Assembly are elected 
by the congress among the 12 people the chairman will propose within the members of the 
science, administration and culture platform. The voting ballots of these candidates are 
prepared separately from the others (article 55/a). According to the 41st article of the bylaw, 
“Science, Administration and Culture Platform” is established by the proposal of the 
chairman. It is stated that these groups, dependent on “The Code of Research and 
Development; Science, Administration and Culture Platform”, are formed temporarily upon 
the decision of “related deputy chairman”.34  Therefore, it would be naive to think that 
members of such a set up formed upon the decision of deputy chairmen can contradict the 
chairman.     
 With regard to use of sheet list in the formation of Party Assembly, when compared 
with AKP, CHP seems a bit more democratic.  However, central manipulation is at issue 
here. Entering the Party Assembly through the quota of the chairman by means of a formation 
existing upon the decision of deputy chairmen, the members of “Science, Administration and 
Culture Platform” make the organization structure more central and more antidemocratic.  
Election of the Candidates and Intra-party Democracy  
 One area to see whether intra-party democracy functions is the process of candidate 
determination and election. SPK dictates just one method in the determining party candidates. 
The law states that candidate determination can be done through such methods as primary 
election, organization/center pole, etc., among which primary election is the most suitable for 
intra-party democracy. However, it is seen that most political parties abstain from it. 
Although primary election does not necessarily guarantee that the right candidate is always 
elected, it still remains to be the most appropriate one by far for democratic philosophy 
(Günal, 2005: 50). However, the fact that the political arena is a place for the struggle for 
                                                          
34 “The Code of Research and Development; Science, Administration and Culture Platform” article 4 
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power and interest might change the course in practice. Instead of seeking for support at the 
base in accordance with democracy, those thinking of being a candidate do it at the top, 
which cripples intra-party democracy. Therefore, “those who want to be delegates generally 
come from those with certain aims in order to be a candidate for MP, etc. Accordingly, 
someone who wants to be an MP has to be accepted and supported by the chairman and the 
party elites” (http://www.etikturkiye.com/etik/siyasetetik/3NigarDEGIRMENCI.pdf). 
According to the 37th article of SPK; “political parties can determine the candidates 
during MP general and by-elections among the applicants whose applications are regarded as 
valid upon one or more of the procedures and principles in their bylaws.” Also, political 
parties can apply the provisions of 298 numbered law, which do not contradict with SPK, 
while determining their candidates during primary elections and upon electoral registers. SPK 
also lets parties present central candidates on the condition of certain quotas. The 37th article  
continues: “Political parties can present central candidates during the primary election on the 
condition that the number does not exceed 5% of the TBMM member whole number and that 
the party informs the Supreme Election Committee (YSK) about the city, election 
environment and candidate order at least 15 days before the date of the primary election. In 
places where there is no primary election, political parties could determine their candidates 
by central poll or through one or more of the other means”. In the article 37/5, stating that 
“the candidate determining process other than central poll will be under the administration 
and supervision of election committees”, democratic functioning is accompanied by a legal 
inspection.  However, candidate determining processes that will facilitate intra-party 
democracy to function are neither made obligatory nor encouraged in SPK. 
The crucial point in actualising intra-party democracy is democratizing candidate 
determining method. A party’s rule, in which executives are appointed by the top and the 
candidates with the right to represent are dictated rather than elected by free voting of all the 
party members, cannot be expected to be democratic and sensitive to the public’s requests. 
Whatever is internalized will be externalized (Günal, 2005: 50). Sağlam (2002: 23) proposes 
in the 37th article about primary election “to determine the party candidates in a primary 
election with the participation of all the party members”. A projected exception could be 
determining at most 10% of the MP candidates through central poll. Moreover, with a change 
in the MP Election Law, “election environment should be reduced and accordingly 
preferential voting should be used”. The basic incentive in these precautions is strengthening 
intra-party democracy. Concentrating on party bylaws and their application shows the 
following. 
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 AKP by-law shows how MPs will be determined in general elections in the articles 
123 and 124. According to article 124, the order of MP candidates should be done as follows 
“a) Primary Election b) Organization Poll c) Centre Poll one, some or all of these methods 
shall be applied at the same election according to the election environment scale at the same 
time altogether or just one of them being applied wholly at national scale”. What is meant by 
primary election is that list order of all the members registered for the party in an election 
environment is determined as primary election electors. Organization poll, on the other hand, 
means doing the list order in a relevant election environment according to the preference of 
those in the senior committees in the administrative organs of a party. The final method, 
centre poll, is doing the candidate list order directly upon central decision by administration 
committee.  
 The 124th article of the by-law seems partially more democratic as it gives primary 
election and organization poll priority while determining the candidate. It says these two 
methods could be applied at least at 50% of the election environment. This is, in fact, a 
democratic make-up for the bylaw, because “could” has no restraints on the party 
administration. Also, in practice, AKP leaves determining the MP candidates to MKYK. The 
newspapers show in terms of the last general elections that thousands of candidate 
applications for 550 chairs were processed by the AKP chairman and a loyal commission of 
5-6 members (Yetkin, 09.04.2011; Sabah Newspaper News 04.04.2011). Additionally, 
another antidemocratic case is the fact that the AKP by-law’s 126th article states that the 
chairman has the right to present 5% of the assembly member whole number; namely 25 
candidates, as center candidates from any election region he wants at any order he likes. It 
should also be noted that this case arises from the Political Parties Law. 
 The bylaws of CHP shows that article 58 stipulates the methods for determining MP 
candidates to be primary election, candidate poll (organization poll) and center poll, the first 
two of which are regarded prior.  
 Party Assembly decides which election method will be used in which election 
environment; therefore, any antidemocratic formation in the Party Assembly will be reflected 
to elections and article 58 aggravates the situation by saying Party Assembly “can put 
adequate number of center candidates into the list in an election environment for primary 
election or candidate poll.” On the other hand, the total number of the candidates determined 
by center poll method is said to “not exceed 15% of the MP candidates of the party”, which 
presents a relatively democratic formation. However, this turns into an antidemocratic 
process where the last elections were a failure because the same article 58 says “the total MP 
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candidate number in election environments which got less than 10% votes in the last elections 
is not included into MP candidate number calculated according to this ratio”.  In the general 
elections of 2007 the number of cities in which CHP got less than 10% votes was 2535, 
whereas in 2011general elections it was 1736. As is seen, the ratio is high; thus, while CHP 
advocates democracy, it also gives credence to antidemocratic tendencies. “Democracy is 
welcomed at the door and ejected from the window.”    
 In this perspective, while center poll was done in CHP in 52 cities during the 2011 
General Elections, primary election was conducted in 19, quota and primary election were 
used in 8 cities, candidate poll was done in 1 city and extended candidate poll was conducted 
in 1 city. As seen here, although in the by-law primary election and candidate poll are cited as 
prior methods, center poll is dominant in the majority of the cities 
(http://www.chp.org.tr/?p=16194). Therefore, Party Assembly and the Centre are a great 
influence on local organs.   
Local Government Elections and Intra-party Democracy  
In local elections, candidate determining and electing methods are similar to general 
elections in both being antidemocratic. This time, the methods of determining mayor 
candidates are at issue. 127th and 128th articles of the AKP by-law show the proceedings of 
candidateship in local elections. These articles refer to the article related to the methods of 
determining MP candidates. It is seen here that the senior administrators of the party and 
therefore the chairman have a great power in determining the candidates in local elections.  
 On the other hand, according to CHP bylaw article 6, the Party Assembly has the 
authority to present a central candidate in local elections and can transfer this authority to city 
administration committees and town administration committees for city elections and town 
elections respectively. The authorized committees consult the organization unit in the election 
environment.   
In the 2014 local elections, in order to prevent any criticism, CHP decided to subject 
its municipalities to “performance inspection” upon objective criteria. During this inspection, 
three main subjects were to be inspected: investments, budget realization and capacity for 
increasing core income. As a result of this evaluation, the successful ones will stay and the 
changes will be done upon public poll (http://emedya.cumhuriyet.com.tr/?hn=332230). 
 According to the main principles in the 2014 elections, there won’t be MP candidates 
for Ankara, İstanbul and İzmir CHP town mayoralty. In this perspective, for the 2014 
                                                          
35 2007 General Election Results, http://belgenet.net/ayrinti.php?yil_id=15&il_id=1058 
36 2011 Election Results, Internet Web News, http://secim.haberler.com/2011/  
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elections, “Regulation for Candidate Determination for Local Elections” will be drawn and 
studies for it are planned on the basis of a 22 month (May 2012-March 2014) calendar. The 
regulation hasn’t been drawn yet. A series of other studies are also proposed. For example, 
there won’t be an old-boy network during the candidate determination process. MPs and 
members of the Party Assembly will be sent to the cities out of their election region to get the 
public opinion reports (http://emedya.cumhuriyet.com.tr/?hn=332230).  
 Especially the use of objective performance criteria in candidate determination and 
talks about doing away with favoritism are positive steps towards intra-party democracy. 
However, to what extent these will be put into practice is to be seen. On the other hand, it is 
meaningful that these are happening when the ex-chairman left after total 16 years of service 
in 3 terms due to a scandal37.   
Head Office Administration and Province Organizations  
 Another point to mention in intra-party democracy in terms of bylaws is the influence 
of head office on province organizations. A powerful and democratic organizational structure 
is imperative for intra-party democracy to function. However, although province 
organizations have major roles in the organization model, they present a weak, insignificant 
and problem appearance with no serious impact on the head office (Vural, 160). SPK reflects 
the power of head office on province organizations, which especially shows itself in dismissal 
of city and town organizations. 
19th and 20th articles of SPK are about the election and dismissal of city and town 
organizations, but in neither article there are clear provisions on how and when dismissal is 
done; instead, a reference was put for the party bylaws. The 19th article about the town 
organization states that the city chairman, elected by the city congress, and the executive 
board could be dismissed by MKYK; therefore, the mechanism that elects does not have the 
power to dismiss what it has elected. It is clear here that the central decision making organ of 
the party is put over its city organization, which can be considered as the extension of 
centralism in Turkish political culture into political parties.  
According to article 19, the decision of dismissal requires a two thirds majority of the 
authorized committees’ member whole number and secret voting. The law requires the city 
congress to elect the new city executive board within 45 days, during which time the congress 
can assemble with ex-delegates if the new ones haven’t been elected yet. Until the 
                                                          
37 Deniz Baykal served his last term in chairmanship between 30th Sept 2000 and 10th May 2010.  
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completion of this process, a temporary executive board composed according to the party by-
law through the initiative of head office is in charge.  
The article 20 about the town organization states that the town chairman and the town 
executive board, both elected by town congress, could be dismissed by the city executive 
board or by MKYK. What is different from article 19 is that besides MKYK, the city 
executive board is also put over town organization. The decision to discharge involves the 
same provisions as the ones in the dismissal decision for city organization. What is different 
is the duration allotted for the new establishment: 30 days. As mentioned above, the 
temporary executive board appointed by the head office will remain in charge until the end of 
this period. While this temporary formation has the right to attend the congress, those among 
those who are not delegates do not have the right to vote. 
The discharge authority of MKYK can turn into a tool to be used in doing away with 
intra-party opposition; therefore, this authority given by SPK can be detrimental to intra-party 
democracy and pluralism. SPK does not require any kind of legal inspection for such 
discharging, which might strengthen intra-party oligarchic tendencies. It should be noted here 
that certain constitutional lawyers proposed legal inspection (Sağlam: 2002: 27). As 
expressed above, the fact that the law does not provide concrete provisions on discharging, 
does not propose any kind of restriction and refer to party bylaws shows that SPK designs the 
party base weak while the head office (center) strong.  
 The articles 57, 58 and 59 in AKP by-law are about the dismissal of the organs and 
they are in line with SPK. The CHP bylaw regulates the dismissal of city, town and province 
chairmen and executive board members. Accordingly; “those who delay or do not serve  their 
duties, responsibilities and financial tasks set forth in laws, bylaws and regulations, who harm 
the party through their attitudes and behaviors inconsistent with the party’s political rules and 
ethics” can be dismissed. As seen here, the reasons for dismissal are obscure; however, while 
dismissing, the reason is also cited. This authority might come from the Central Executive 
Committee as well as from the related senior executive committee (article 43/b). Therefore, 
as mentioned before, while the party base gets weaker, the center becomes stronger. One 
concrete reason for dismissal that stands out is the expression “when the vote percentage of 
the party in general election in the election environment in the responsibility of city, town or 
province executive unit falls compared with the previous election, then the related executive 
unit could be dismissed by Central Executive Committee.” Considering that in general 
elections, not the candidate but the party is voted, it is very hard to determine to what extent 
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the local organizations are responsible for the MP election results.   On the other hand, a 
senior executive unit can warn an inferior unit by citing the reason in writing (article 43/a). 
Determining the Party Program and Intra-party Democracy  
 The article 14 in SPK authorizes the big congress for any change in the party bylaws 
and the program and any decision for party policies. SPK requires the proposal of the 
chairman and at least one twentieth of the members of MKYK and big congress. The same 
article states “in order to decide on proposals on public actions regarding the society and the 
state within the frame of laws, party bylaws and party programs, these proposals have to be 
put forward by one third of the members attending the big congress.” These proposals will be 
discussed at a commission appointed by the big congress and will later be decided upon the 
commission report. When the issues regard the public, SPK raises the ratio from one 
twentieth to one third. 
In the article 16 of SPK, a wide authority range is allotted for Central Decision organ. 
Except for the two restrictions by law, this organ works like the party brain. In law, central 
decision will not only decide upon “all the decisions, except for the legal termination of the 
party and the change in party bylaws and the program, when the big congress cannot 
assemble” but also lay down party internal regulations. 
Considering the congress discussions in Turkey, it is seen that party programs are almost 
never discussed. Those directing the party program are, as in AKP and CHP, the elites or 
academics elected by the executives through the manipulation of the chairman. This also 
shows how important a chairman is.  
Gender and Youth Quota  
 According to the by-law of CHP, there is at least 33%38 gender quota in determining 
the MP candidates through centre poll, in Party Assembly election, in the election of city, 
town, province executive organs, in the election of the candidates for provincial council and 
city council members and in the election of congress delegates. If not adequate candidates 
come from both genders, the election proceeds with the participants (article 61). On the other 
hand, there is a youth quota in every area where gender quota is applied in CHP. However, 
one has to be a member of youth branches from the date of candidateship. Also, the quota for 
gender is at least 33%, while it is at least 10% for youth; however, if not adequate candidates 
come into the scope of gender and youth quotas, the election proceeds with the participants. 
A candidate carrying the characteristics of both quotas is decreased from both quotas. 
                                                          
38 After an amendmend in the by-law in 2012, the number of female quota was raised from 25% to 33% 
(http://chpkadin.chp.org.tr/2012/03/03/chp-kadin-kotasini-yukseltti/) 
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Another critical issue is that within the scope of gender and youth quotas, those who could 
only get the votes of less than one fifth of the congress member whole number are not 
regarded as original or substitute member (article 61). This point is significant in that it 
emphasizes the representation. CHP Women’s Branch Chairwoman Deniz Pınar Atılgan 
states that the 33% quota is pertained more than 80%. However, the Society of Women 
Candidate Support states that despite the quota, in the many CHP city and town congresses, 
women come up against difficulties, their names are crossed over and they can’t participate in 
the administration. On the other hand, there are almost no women in southern cities 
(http://www.ka-der.org.tr/tr/basin.php?act=sayfa&id00=116&id01=65&menu=).  
 It should be noted that the quota is required not for a result but for candidateship. In 
2011 general elections, one of the cities where the candidates were determined through 
central poll was Ankara. It was composed of two election environments: in both 
environments the number of women candidates was below the gender quota.  Even in the 
capital, they couldn’t pertain the quota. But on the other hand, although they were below the 
quota, the women candidates were placed on good orders in the lists 
(http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/index.html) 
Conclusion 
Various researchers have stated that the political parties in Turkey have oligarchic 
tendencies. This research tried to answer whether the applicable law in the Constitution, 
Political Parties Act and Party Bylaws is designed so as to facilitate or complicate intra-party 
democracy. As seen clearly above, one of the major obstacles for intra-party democracy is 
SPK. The main law regulating political parties in Turkey could only determine the 
importance of parties in a democratic regime, but could not provide an appropriate ground for 
intra-party democracy to flourish. In other words, SPK does not possess such imperatives to 
encourage intra-party democracy in Turkey: rather than providing imperatives for intra-party 
democracy in the election of delegates, determination of MP candidates or chairman election, 
it leaves the job to party bylaws. 
Analysis of the party bylaws clearly shows that they don’t possess any imperatives to 
encourage intra-party democracy. Even in the issues that could encourage intra-party 
democracy, they don’t have any regulations that could restrict the party centre’s hands. On 
the other hand, political parties, who cannot give up the democratic principle as a good 
image, have made a democracy make-up onto their bylaws, for which AKP’s intra-party 
democracy arbitration committee is a good example. When you hear this name, you think that 
it will activate intra-party democracy, but in fact, it only facilitates intra-party bureaucracy. 
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The case is the same in CHP although it seems slightly different: CHP, after 16 years, went 
for democratic amendments in its bylaws after a change in chairmanship, but the democratic 
principles seeming to be welcomed at the door were ejected from the window through little 
legal tricks. 
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